Private standards are increasingly governing international food trade, but little is known about the implications for developing countries. The objective of the study is to provide evidence in the ongoing debate on standards as barrier or catalyst for developing countries' export. We use the Peruvian fresh asparagus export sector as a case study and provide empirical panel data evidence on the effects of certification to private food standards on export volumes of firms. Our dataset on the transactions of 569 export firms from 1993 to 2011 allows us to take export dynamics and time trends into account, as well as to keep country and sector specific effects constant. In our empirical strategy, we first use simple OLS and ignore firm-specific unobservable effects and dynamic export patterns. We then account for export persistence, as well as company fixed effects and finally, we use System-GMM estimators to address potential reversed causality issues. These approaches represent substantial methodological improvements as compared to previous studies on the trade effects of private standards. The empirical innovation is crucial for the appropriate impact estimation, as results indicate that certification to standards has a positive effect on the export volumes of companies, but that the significant effect dwindles as soon as unobserved firm heterogeneity and export persistency are properly controlled for. Additional studies with large data availabilities are needed to further disentangle the effect and confirm the case study results.
Introduction
Standards are increasingly governing international trade in agricultural and food products (Jaffee & Henson, 2004; Henson & Reardon, 2005) . These standards are set by public authorities, i.e., public standards, or by private food companies and other non-state actors, i.e., private standards. While public standards mainly focus on food quality and safety issues and compliance is usually compulsory, private standards often additionally focus on ethical and environmental concerns of food production and trade and company's adherence is typically made on a voluntary basis (Humphrey, 2008) . This creates a non-regulated area that goes beyond the competence of national authorities and opens up a new debate on the legal dimensions of private standards (Marx et al., 2012) ; for example on whether and how private sector standards should fall under the WTO's SPS Agreement (WTO, 2007) .
A main concern is that standards in general, and private standards in particular, create new non-tariff barriers to trade. It has been argued that standards especially diminish the export opportunities of poor countries who do not have the financial and technical capacity to meet strict requirements (Garcia-Martinez & Poole, 2004; Unnevehr, 2000) . Others have argued that standards could spur developing country exports because they induce processes of production system upgrading and supply chains modernization and lead to the re-positioning of countries and companies in global markets (Henson & Jaffee, 2008; Jaffee and Masakure, 2005; Jaffee & Henson, 2004; Maertens & Swinnen, 2006) . The Kenyan fresh produce export sector has for example been mentioned to have thrived because it has met the challenge of rising standards and has used this as an opportunity to redefine the industry's competitive advantage (Jaffee, 2003) . There is a growing body of empirical literature that aims at providing evidence in this debate on standards-as-barriers versus standards-as-catalyst to trade. The main part of the evidence comes from macro-economic trade models, usually gravity models, that estimate the impact of increasing standards on international trade flows.
This literature has mainly focused on the trade effects of public standards and mainly points to evidence in support of the standards-as-barriers view. For example, Anders & Caswell (2009) find that mandatory HACCP standards for fish imports in the US strongly reduced US imports from developing countries. Likewise, Otsuki, Wilson, & Sewadeh, (2001) find that aflatoxin standards in the EU reduced groundnut exports from African countries. Wilson & Otsuki (2003) and Wilson, Otsuki & Majumdar (2003) find that public regulations on aflatoxin in nuts and hormones in beef in high-income countries reduce exports from developing countries but that a harmonization of diverging national standards according to the prescriptions of the Codex Alimentarius could increase trade. Similarly Czubala, Shepherd, & Wilson (2007) find evidence that non harmonized standards reduce African exports of textile products, but that EU standards which are harmonized to ISO standards are less trade restricting.
Empirical evidence from gravity models is very informative in the debate but fails to capture microeconomic effects. Individual companies and producers may react differently to increasing standards, resulting in different trade impacts. Especially in analyzing the trade effects of private standards this company heterogeneity might matter importantly as this concerns voluntary standards and companies choose whether to comply or not. Some authors have analyzed firm-level trade effects of public standards, and again point to negative effects of standards for developing countries' exports. For example, Chen, Otsuki, & Wilson (2006) find that technical regulations decrease the export propensity of companies in developing countries and the number of markets they can enter. Maskus, Otsuki, & Wilson (2005) estimate the impact of technical regulations on companies production costs and conclude that standards act as barriers because they substantially increase production costs. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one study that provides evidence on the firm-level trade effects of private standards 1 . Henson, Masakure, & Cranfield (2011) empirically investigate the impact of GlobalGAP on the export revenue of fresh produce exporters in 10 African countries. Their results support the standards-as-catalyst point of view and suggest that certification to private standards schemes has considerably increased firms' export revenues.
A main problem with these micro-economic studies is that they all use cross-sectional data from several countries and sectors to analyze the firm-level trade effects of standards. With such data it is impossible to take into account export dynamics and to control for country, sector and company heterogeneity. Specifically in the analysis of private standards this might be problematic because not all companies adhere to the standards and the decision to do so might depend on unobserved heterogeneity and past export performance, which might lead to an overestimation of the impact of private standards from cross-sectional data. In this paper, we analyze firm-level trade effects of private standards in the fresh asparagus export sector in Peru. Due to the size of the industry with around 100 exporting firms per year, its long history and availability of panel data for the period 1993-2011, and its changing international trade relations, the Peruvian asparagus export sector represents a unique casestudy from a scientific perspective. Country and sector specific aspects can be held constant, export persistence can be taken into account, and unobserved heterogeneity and company selfselection into private standards compliance can be corrected for. These are important methodological improvements in comparison with previous cross-sectional firm-level research on the trade effects of private standards.
The structure of this paper is as follows: we first describe the Peruvian fresh asparagus export data and firm sampling strategy. We then provide descriptive evidence on the evolution of export volumes, private food certification schemes and the firm characteristics of our firm sample. Further, we define our estimation strategy and report econometric results, as well as robustness checks. We conclude with some policy implications and ideas on future research directions.
Data
We use a unique firm level dataset on Peruvian asparagus exports constructed from secondary sources and own original data collection. First, secondary data include custom data (SUNATPeru) at a transaction level on fresh asparagus exports over the period 1993 -2011. This dataset contains information on 569 fresh asparagus export firms and includes the identification of the exporter (firms' names and tax identification number), the exported volume, the destination market and the FOB value for all export transactions. We merge this dataset with tax administration data, containing information on the foundation date of the firms, core activities, general managers, location, branches, as well as historical fiscal benefits or irregularities.
Second, we complement these secondary data with primary data from a survey among a representative sample of export companies. From the total population of 569 firms that at least once exported fresh asparagus between 1993 and 2011, we draw a stratified random sample of 100 companies. We randomly selected companies from three mutually exclusive strata, according to the companies exporting experience: consolidated companies with ≥ 6 years of exporting experience (total population of 63 companies), intermediate companies,
between 3 and 5 years of exporting experience (90 companies) and start off companies with ≤ 2 years of experiences (416 companies). To ensure the representativeness of the sample and due to the relatively lower number of the first two categories, we oversample the first two strata. The sample includes both companies that are operative in 2011, as well as companies that ceased operations by that year, which ensures its representativeness not only for the current situation but for the whole period. The survey was implemented between July and September 2011 using an original questionnaire including recall questions on certification to private food standards, on ownership and management structure, on processing and production procedures, and on sourcing and marketing strategies. Due to field logistics 7 of the 100 sampled companies could not be interviewed. Another 7 surveyed companies only exceptionally export fresh asparagus and are therefore dropped from the sample. This leaves us with a unique firm level dataset of 86 companies, including 42 consolidated companies, 27
intermediate companies and 17 start-off companies. Over the entire period they represent 66,2% of the overall fresh asparagus export volume.
The Peruvian asparagus export sector

Increasing exports
The asparagus sector currently accounts for about 25% of the country's total agricultural exports. More than 220,000 metric tons (mt) of asparagus are produced yearly and practically the whole production is exported, either as fresh produce or as frozen or preserved products (SUNAT, 2011) . Production zones range from 400 km south to 800 km north of Lima along the desert coast ( Figure 1 ). Seventy percent of the produce is exported unprocessed, which makes Peru the largest exporter of fresh asparagus worldwide. The main destination markets for fresh asparagus exports are the USA and countries in the European Union. The totality of the products reached its final destination market from the metropolitan area of Lima, either by airplanes (85 % of the product) or refrigerated ships Oversea shipments represent the highest transport cost burden, while local transportation costs play a minor role and do not considerably affect the competitiveness across the different location of firms.
[Take in Figure 1] The history of cultivation and export of asparagus from Peru goes back to the 1950s, when [Take in Figure 2 ]
The number of fresh asparagus export companies has evolved in a similar manner. The number has tripled from around 40 companies at the end of the 1990s to almost 120 companies in 2006, and remained at around 100 companies per year since 2006. The total number of 569 companies from the custom database that ever exported fresh asparagus since
Increasing private standards
Private standards started to gain importance in the fresh asparagus export sector in 2000 and certification to these standards has spread rapidly in the sector from then onwards. Figure 3 shows, for our 86 sampled companies, the evolution of the certified and non-certified export volumes and the number of certified and non-certified companies over the period 1993-2011.
[Take in Figure export companies are Tesco, SQF1000, SQF2000, IFS, and Leaf but these are adopted by less than 10% of all companies in 2011 (and are therefore not reported in Figure 4 ).
[Take in Figure 4 ]
In what follows we refer to 'certification' and 'certified companies' when companies are certified to at least one of the above mentioned private standards present in the sector. Our interest lies in the trade effect of certification in general and not in the effects of specific private standards.
Company heterogeneity
Before turning to an econometric analysis of the impact of certification on companies export performance, we describe all observable company variables used in the empirical models (table 1) . Most variables in Table 1 are drawn from the total population of asparagus export companies but some variables, indicated with an asterisk, are drawn from the survey sample of companies. We distinguish between time varying, i.e., changing from one year to other, and time constant variables.
[Take in Table 1] Further, we address the heterogeneity of firms. For the variables which are considered most important in our analysis, we first compare firm characteristics in 2000, i.e., prior to the spread of private food standards in the asparagus export sector, and 2011, the last year of observation (Table 2) . To make correct inferences, the data drawn from the survey sample of companies and representing estimates of population averages instead of population averages are adjusted for stratification in the sampling method with sampling weights.
[Take in Table 2 ]
From Table 2 Furthermore, we compare firm characteristics for certified and non-certified companies in 2011 (Table 3 ). The figures in Table 3 volume but that this is mainly associated with larger export volumes ex ante, before private standards spread in the sector, and less with larger growth rates.
[Take in Table 3] Second, certified firms are more likely to own a plant (88%) and/or agricultural land (89%) than non-certified firms (27% and 25% respectively). None of the certified firms are pure traders without land or plant while slightly more than half of the non-certified firms are pure traders. This is logic as pure traders are not eligible for most certificates because they do not own a certifiable plant or production unit. Also, the average landholdings are substantially larger for certified firms (55 ha) than for non-certified firms (3 ha).
Third, certified companies are more likely to have foreign capital and are substantially older companies with more years of experience in asparagus export. The latter indicates that there is less entry and exit among certified companies. Indeed, 63% the currently certified companies are pioneers who were already in the market before 2003 while this is only 3% for noncertified companies. In addition, also the location of certified and non-certified companies differs slights. Almost 70% of certified companies operate in the Ica valley and 20% in La
Libertad while for non-certified companies this is 58% and 30% respectively.
In summary, the descriptive statistics in Table 2 and 3 show that there are important trends over time since the spread of private standards and important differences between certified and non-certified companies. Whether the observed large difference in export volume between certified and non-certified companies can be attributed to the impact of private standards is still questionable as time trends and confounding factors that influence both the decision to seek certification and the export volumes need to be controlled for. In the next section we present several econometric methods to deal with company heterogeneity and the endogenous character of certification, and discuss the estimation results.
Econometric analysis of trade effects
Model Specification
To assess whether the observed higher export quantities of certified firms are due to the causal impact of certification we estimate regressions of the following type:
Where ExpVol it is the logarithm of the exported volume of company i in year t. The key variable of interest in the Model is certification of company i in year t (C it ), which is measured in three different ways: 1/ as a dummy variable for certification (equaling one if company i is certified in year t), 2/ as the number of certificates a company holds (ranging from 0 to 11), and 3/ as the number of years the company has been certified (ranging from 0 to 13,5). ExpVol i,t-1 represents a one-year lag of the logarithm of the exported volume of a company. The vector X it is a large set of observable firm characteristics. These include variables related to the type and the size of companies, their experience, their assets, their access to capital, tax pay regimes, management changes, and their location and are described in detail in Table 1 . Year dummies D t are included to control for common macro-economic effects and v it is the error term.
Estimation technique
The main issue in estimating equation (1) and identifying the causal impact of certification on export performance, is the potential endogeneity of the certification variable which would invalidate all regression results. The endogeneity could be due to 1/ a potential reversed causality bias, i.e., certification decision is potentially determined by current export volumes, 2/ the fact that certification is eventually predetermined, i.e., it could depend on past export volumes, or 3/ the simultaneity of certification and export volumes, according to which unobservable shocks would contemporaneously affect export volumes and the certification decision. .
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The process of certification involves a relatively long auditing procedure; we find it therefore reasonable to assume that certification does not depend on current exports and thus to rule out a reversed causality bias (above mentioned, 1 st cause of endogeneity). Yet, past export performance and unobservable firm characteristics (2 nd and 3 rd causes of endogeneity), such as managerial ability and internal organization, are both likely to influence the certification decision and the current export performance. In the trade literature, such factors have indeed been shown to affect export performance indicators. Roberts and Tybout (1995) for example find in a dynamic export model that sunk costs are large and a significant source of export persistence. Jensen (1999, 2004) report a large unobserved heterogeneity and differences in performance between exporters and non-exporters. Failing to control for past export experience and unobservable characteristics would likely lead to an overestimation of the impact of certification on export performance.
We use several estimation techniques to control for dynamic and unobserved effects and thus the above mentioned 2 nd and 3 rd potential issues of endogeneity . First, we ignore firmspecific unobserved effects and the dynamic export pattern and estimate equation (1) using OLS and without controlling for previous export performance, ExpVol i,t-1 . This procedure has been used in previous studies to estimate the effects of certification on export performance when no systematic panel data were available (e.g., Chen et al., 2006; Henson et al., 2011) . If export volumes are sticky or if unobserved factors that are positively (negatively) correlated with certification also positively (negatively) affect export volumes, this method likely results in an overestimation of the effect of certification on export performance. We use a linear method although our dependent variable ExpVol i,t exhibits a probability mass at 0 because companies do not necessarily export in all years. Tobit models and maximum likelihood estimation might be more appropriate but we opt for OLS estimation for comparability with subsequent models that do take into account unobserved effects. Chay and Hyslop (1998) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) moreover have shown that linear models perform as well as more complex non-linear estimation strategies with unobservable characteristics.
Second, we account for export persistence by including the lag of the dependent export performance variable ExpVol i,t-1 as regressor. Since past export performance is likely positively correlated with the current certification decision, we expect the bias on the certification variable to decrease when controlling for export persistence.
Third, we explicitly consider the role of unobserved firm heterogeneity and re-specify equation (1) by decomposing the error term v it in a time-constant and a time-varying component, ε i and u it respectively:
Plugging equation (2) in (1), we obtain an unobserved fixed effects model in which timeconstant unobserved heterogeneity ε i can be controlled for. We estimate the adjusted equation with the standard within (fixed effects) estimator. The standard within-transformation eliminates ε i but might still yield biased and inconsistent estimates (Nickell, 1981) . The lagged export volume ExpVol i,t-1 is not strictly exogenous and it has been shown that in this case the coefficient β 2 on ExpVol i,t-1 would be biased downward (Bond, 2002) . More problematic, also the certification C it variable is likely not strictly exogenous and if a positive shock to past export volumes positively affects the likelihood of certification, the standard fixed effects estimator would also lead to a downward bias in the estimated certification coefficient β 1 . A similar upward or downward bias can be expected on any other predetermined variable in X it , related to the 'fixed effect' transformed error term.
Fourth, we estimate the model using the System General Method of Moments (System GMM) approach of Bond, 1999. Arellano and Bond (1991) first proposed to deal with the above-described unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity problems by combining a first difference transformation with an instrumental variable estimation strategy. The within transformation eliminates the fixed firm characteristics ε i , while lagged levels of the explanatory variables and further lags of the dependent variable are used as instruments in the first-differenced equation to get rid of the endogeneity problem (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Bond, 2002) . A potential problem with this estimator are its poor finite sample properties in terms of bias and precision when time series are persistent, because in this case the instruments might be weak predictors of the endogenous changes (Blundell & Bond, 1998) . Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1999) propose, in addition to the firstdifferenced moment conditions, also the moment conditions in levels using lagged firstdifferences of the explanatory and the dependent variables as instruments for the equation in levels. The two different moment conditions are combined in the so called System GMM.
For the choice of the instruments it is important to ascertain whether all included explanatory variables are strictly exogenous, predetermined or simultaneously endogenous, i.e., to respectively be independent, depend on past or depend on current export performance. Only time dummies are treated as exogenous. All firm-specific characteristics, including the certification variable for the reasons explained above,are assumed to be predetermined, except for the total cultivated asparagus land, which is taken as endogenous. We consider this to be the most reasonable assumption, as, except for the rather quick purchase and sale of land, the adaptation of other firm characteristics (including certification) to changes in the export performance is not immediate For completeness, we also examined the case in which the certification variable was treated as simultaneously endogenous to the export volumes (above mentioned 1 st cause of endogeneity) but results were not affected and we therefore stick to our assumption and treat it as a predetermined variable in the model. Fifth, we use the same system GMM estimator as above but extend the lagged instruments by one level in the difference equation. This comes down to instrumenting all first differenced predetermined variables with their levels from one to four inclusive and the endogenous land variable from two to four inclusive; in the levels equation the number of instruments does not change. To the extent that this specification of the system GMM estimator introduces more information, it should improve efficiency, and at the same time test the robustness of the results to an alternative set of instruments (Roodman, 2007 (Roodman, & 2009 .
With this combination of different estimation techniques, we can overcome methodological shortcomings in previous papers that have estimated the impact of certification to private standards on firm-level export performance. We believe that the system GMM estimator gives the most correct estimates with the smallest bias while the OLS and the fixed effects estimators likely result in respectively an upward and downward bias of the effect of private standards on company export performance. Tables 4 to 6 (Table 4) , the number of certificates a company holds and its square (Table 5) ; and the number of years a company has been certified ( Table 6 ) . The full regression results are reported only in Table 4 while in Tables 5 and 6 Our main result is that, when not controlling for time dynamics and unobserved heterogeneities (Model 1), certification has a large and significant positive effect on asparagus export volumes but that the estimated effect reduces sharply and becomes less significant when controlling for time trends (Model 2), and becomes completely insignificant when additionally controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (Model 3, 4 and 5). This result is consistent for different specifications of the certification variable.
Results and discussion
The estimated effects in Model 1 are two to five times larger than in the other models, which is in line with our expectations that OLS without lagged dependent variables overestimates the effect because of a positive correlation between past export performance and certification.
When controlling for past export performance (Model 2), the estimated effects reduce but remain significant (at the 10% level) for the number of certificates (table 5 ) and the number of years of certification (Table 6 ). Fixed effects estimation (Model 3) produces estimates that are smaller than in the other models, especially for the number of certificates (Table 5) markets. Yet, also methodological differences likely explain the contradicting findings.
Failure to control for export persistence and for unobserved heterogeneity in previous studies might have led to an overestimation of the impact of private standards.
Further, we find that lagged export volumes have a significant and large positive effect on current export volumes, which is an indication of the expected export persistence. This effect is consistent across the different models and specifications, although, as expected, the coefficients are larger in Model 2 and smaller in Model 3 than in models 4 and 5. This is again an indication of the expected upward and downward bias in respectively the OLS and fixed effects estimations, and pleads in favor of the validity of the models 4 and 5.
Other firm characteristics have an impact on export performance as well. Ownership of a processing plant and agricultural land have a significant positive effect -the effect is decreasing for land. The age of a company has a negative but increasing effect on export performance, Export experience has a positive and decreasing effectThese results indicate that established processing and production companies perform better in the export market than trading companies who easily enter and exit. Furthermore, having multiple tax identifiers and a status as good taxpayer enters the regression with a positive and significant coefficient. In both cases, either because firms artificially create a second export company (and pay taxes on two small instead of one large company) or because they are classified as reliable entities by the national tax authority, they face a lower tax burden, which translates into increased export volumes.
[Take in Table 4 , 5, 6]
Robustness check
Around 40% of export companies in 2011 were only trading fresh asparagus, by buying from external producers and renting in other exporters' processing facilities. Since they do not own land nor a processing plant they cannot be certified to private food standards. The inclusion of these type of companies could affect our results in either direction: if traders export less than other firms (e.g., due to fluctuations in the provision of primary produce) the certification coefficient would be biased upwards, while if traders export more than other firms (e.g., due to a higher flexibility and an easier adaptation to demand fluctuations), the certification coefficient would be biased downwards. To assure that pooling these different types of companies does not influence our results, we check the robustness of our estimations by excluding the companies for which certification is not applicable (table 7) . This reduces the number of observations from roughly 700 to 500. When comparing the results from Table 7 with those from tables 4, 5 and 6, we see that all coefficients of the certification variable are reduced and remain insignificant in models 4 and 5. This corroborates our finding that traders in general tend to export less than other firms, and indicates that excluding them from the analysis does not affect our findings. We performed similar robustness controls by restricting the samples to only companies with or only companies without land, and only companies with or without a processing plant. These results do not change our findings and are not reported.
[Take in Table 7 ]
Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the firm-level trade effects of increasing private standards in the asparagus export sector in Peru. A simple comparison of export volumes between certified and non-certified companies and a pooled OLS estimation, controlling for observed company effects, revealed that export volumes of certified companies are four to five times those of non-certified companies. However, when properly controlling for export persistence over time and for unobserved company effects, this positive effect of certification on company export performance disappears. Our results suggest that exports are sticky and that intrinsic and unobserved firm characteristics, such as entrepreneurial ability, openness towards innovations and personal links with importers play an essential role in determining both export volumes and certification to private standards.
Our findings refute the standards-as-catalyst view that has been put forward in the literature and contradict earlier empirical findings on the firm-level trade effects of private standards.
Because previous studies failed to control for export persistence and for unobserved effects, they likely overestimated the impact of certification on exports performance. The methodological improvements we made -that were possible due to the availability of panel data including a large number of observations over many years -are therefore important. We would definitely urge for the use of panel data and appropriate methods to correctly assess the impact of private food standards.
We recognize that our case-study approach has limitations and that our findings cannot be generalized. The fact that certification to private standards was found to have no impact on the export performance of companies might be related to the specific case-study. Peru is a middle income country and had an established asparagus export sector before the spread of private standards. The effects of private standards might be different in the poorest countries and in less established export sectors. In such cases, export persistence might play a less important role and private standards might be an important market signaling tool. Moreover, since we rely on an export-custom database, our analysis is conditioned on companies that have at least once exported fresh asparagus, excluding merely producing companies. This could explain why our results differ with the literature on standards as catalyst looking at firms that may have never exported. Yet, based on our findings, ongoing investments of NGOs and development agencies to support developing country exporters to comply with private standards and seek certification, are questionable. Especially in middle income countries and in established export sectors with a long history, there might be no return to such development projects. In order to confirm these conclusions further research is however needed to establish the effect of certification on the export values and export destinations, as it could be that certification boosts value of exports and/or profits and allows to price discriminate, while destinations may have changed to tease out better prices.
Wilson, J. S., Otsuki, T., & Majumdar, B. (2003 Company cluster robust standard errors in parenthesis for the OLS and FE estimations. Robust finite samples corrected standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005) in parenthesis for the system GMM; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Column (4), (9) and (14): lags t-1 to t-3 for predetermined, t-2 to t--3 for endogenous variables; Second order autocorrelation in the GMM estimates is rejected at the 10% level. The null hypothesis of valid instruments' specification is accepted at the 10% level with the Hansen test of over-identification restrictions and the Difference Hansen test
